Randall Kennedy's "My Race Problem"

No teacher should view certain students as his racial "brothers and sisters" while viewing others as, well, mere students. — Randall Kennedy

A brute fact does not dictate the proper human response to it. ... In choosing how to proceed in the face of all that they encounter, blacks should insist, as did Martin Luther King Jr., that acting with moral propriety is itself a glorious goal. — Kennedy

Unless inhibited, every person and group will tend toward beliefs and practices that are self-aggrandizing. — Kennedy

I would propose a shoe-on-the-other-foot test for the propriety of racial sentiment. If a sentiment or practice would be judged offensive when voiced or implemented by anyone, it should be viewed as prima facie offensive generally. — Kennedy

In 1997 Harvard law professor Randall Kennedy wrote "My Race Problem: A consideration of touchy matters -- racial pride, racial solidarity, and racial loyalty -- rarely discussed."

"What," he asked, "is the proper role of race in determining how I, an American black, should feel toward others?"

It was a liberal African American's response to a left issue of the time, multiculturalism. Today we would call it the politics of identity.

The politics of identity is the politics of approved identity. Professor Kennedy immediately objects to the proposition that

There is nothing wrong with having a special -- a racial -- affection for other black people. Indeed, many would go further and maintain that something would be wrong with me if I did not sense and express racial pride, racial kinship, racial patriotism, racial loyalty, racial solidarity -- synonyms for that amalgam of belief, intuition, and commitment that manifests itself when blacks treat blacks with more solicitude than they do those who are not black. ... [There is a] notion that blackness gives rise to racial obligation and that black people should have a special, closer, more affectionate relationship with their fellow blacks than with others in America's diverse society.

Professor Kennedy replies, "I reject this response to the question. Neither racial pride nor racial kinship offers guidance that is intellectually, morally, or politically satisfactory. ... the belief that because of racial kinship blacks ought to value blacks more highly than others." Such attempts to counteract discrimination recreate discrimination in another form.

Stephen L. Carter, a professor at Yale Law School writes, in Reflections of an Affirmative Action Baby, "Each December, my wife and I host a holiday dessert for the black students at the Yale Law School." He says that he feels a special "solidarity" with them, a racial love for "one's people."

Professor Kennedy:

I contend that in the mind, heart, and soul of a teacher there should be no stratification of students such that a teacher feels closer to certain pupils than to others on grounds of racial kinship. No teacher should view certain students as his racial "brothers and sisters" while viewing others as, well, mere students. Every student should be free of the worry that because of race, he or she will have less opportunity to benefit from what a teacher has to offer.

Randall Kennedy suggests that instead of the left principle of solidarity, which tends to result in a double standard, we should engage in a liberal method: outreach:

The justification for outreach ... is that unlike an appeal to racial kinship, an appeal to an ideal untrammeled by race enables any person or group to be the object of solicitude. No person or group is racially excluded from the possibility of assistance, and no person or group is expected to help only "our own." If a professor reaches out in response to student need, for instance, that means that whereas black students may deserve special solicitude today, Latino students or Asian-American students or white students may deserve it tomorrow.

History, Kennedy argues, is a poor argument for a double standard:

Some will argue that I ignore or minimize the fact that different groups are differently situated and that it is thus justifiable to impose upon blacks and whites different standards for purposes of evaluating conduct, beliefs, and sentiments. ... A brute fact does not dictate the proper human response to it. That is a matter of choice -- constrained, to be sure, but a choice nonetheless. In choosing how to proceed in the face of all that they encounter, blacks should insist, as did Martin Luther King Jr., that acting with moral propriety is itself a glorious goal.

People who have suffered past wrongs, unfortunately, are no more immune than anyone else to the temptation of favoritism toward one's own:

In seeking to attain that goal, blacks should be attuned not only to the all too human cruelties and weaknesses of others but also to the all too human cruelties and weaknesses in themselves. A good place to start is with the recognition that unless inhibited, every person and group will tend toward beliefs and practices that are self-aggrandizing. This is certainly true of those who inherit a dominant status. But it is also true of those who inherit a subordinate status. Surely one of the most striking features of human dynamics is the alacrity with which those who have been oppressed will oppress whomever they can once the opportunity presents itself. Because this is so, it is not premature to worry about the possibility that blacks or other historically subordinated groups will abuse power to the detriment of others.

Another argument against double standards concerning identity is reciprocity: They don't meet the "shoe-on-the-other-foot test":

A second reason I resist arguments in favor of asymmetrical standards of judgment has to do with my sense of the requirements of reciprocity. I find it difficult to accept that it is wrong for whites to mobilize themselves on a racial basis solely for purposes of white advancement but morally permissible for blacks to mobilize themselves on a racial basis solely for purposes of black advancement. I would propose a shoe-on-the-other-foot test for the propriety of racial sentiment. If a sentiment or practice would be judged offensive when voiced or implemented by anyone, it should be viewed as prima facie offensive generally. If we would look askance at a white professor who wrote that on grounds of racial kinship he values the opinions of whites more than those of blacks, then unless given persuasive reasons to the contrary, we should look askance at a black professor who writes that on grounds of racial kinship he values the opinions of blacks more than those of whites.